On July 14, 2022 Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a bill into law that dramatically broadens the definition of a “foreign agent.” Now, any one deemed “under foreign influence” can be classified as such an agent and be subject to strenuous audits, fees, and severe penalties for noncompliance. The bill goes into effect on December 31 of this year.
Here at the FARA Files, we have written before about foreign agent laws in other countries, but there we focused on our fellow democracies. We have also written about Russia’s elaborate propaganda efforts inside the United States through the lens of FARA disclosures. This time, we are focusing on how autocracies, specifically Russia, use foreign agent laws to suppress dissent among their own people and undermine the freedom of expression everywhere.
Putin’s new law is the latest in a string of laws he has enacted over the last decade to curtail and control opposition inside Russia. These laws have gradually expanded the definition of foreign agent to a term vague enough to go after any perceived enemy of Vladimir Putin. In 2012, the first installment of these laws, it applied almost entirely to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who received funding from abroad.
Even in its first iteration, the law was oppressive. NGOs were subject to extreme levels of filing and reporting to the Russian government including quarterly financial updates, activity reports every six months, and intense annual audits.
In contrast to Putin’s approach, the first FARA law in the U.S. (which was squarely aimed at fascist and communist activities), merely required registering with the Justice Department (pdf. 20).
In June 2014, Putin’s Ministry of Justice was empowered to list organizations as “foreign agents” unilaterally, without any consultation with the entity in question. Organizations that object to the label can take up the issue in the courts, but even if they win, as the Norwegian Helsinki Committee reported, Russian authorities would regularly recycle their old arguments into a civil lawsuit—often winning. This placed NGOs in a bind, as failure to comply could easily result in jailtime for organization leaders and a shuttering of the group entirely, but compliance would itself often prove overly burdensome.
Another change in the law came in 2019 when it was expanded from NGOs to include other groups and even individuals who received any level of funding from overseas.
This most recent revision to the foreign agent laws is even more extreme.
Not only does it remove the financial element from what defines a foreign agent, the law expands the number of activities that deemed foreign agents are prohibited from doing. Foreign agents are now prohibited from almost all political activity, including donating to political parties or partaking in campaigns, holding and organizing public events of any kind, and they are banned from teaching in public schools.
Since Putin’s war against Ukraine was revamped in February, his regime has gone on the offensive against domestic critics and media outlets. The day after signing the bill into law, the Russian government banned the Dutch research outlet Bellingcat and its partner outlet The Insider from the country. This is part of a long-established pattern in Putin’s behavior, but now with the bloated definition of “foreign agent” in effect, the Russian government can now more easily silence bloggers and other online content creators. Often working alone, it is unlikely that many creators could keep up with the reporting requirements.
Ultimately, Putin’s efforts to stifle dissent have turned Russia into a bleak land for free expression. By using the levers of power to control the narrative, native opposition both generally against Putin, but also specifically against his crusade against Ukraine, have crumbled. He has nearly created an information monopoly.
Putin’s creeping war against domestic opposition under the guise of “foreign influence” draws a sharp contrast with American efforts to address foreign influence. FARA’s general purpose is to highlight activities (pdf.10), specifically media and communications, funded by foreign actors, not to prohibit them. Registering under FARA is an open process, with filings posted publicly, and with an emphasis on voluntary compliance. While Putin has continually expanded the scope of what constitutes foreign influence, and in turn turning more of his own people into enemies of the state, a significant push in the United States has been to narrow or streamline the scope (pdf 9-23).
Perhaps that is a key distinction between a free society and a closed one. Many in the U.S. may wish to broaden what constitutes foreign influence, especially as the specter of conflict with China rises by the day, Putin’s increasingly expansive approach suggests that doing so will only turn more of us against each other while only strengthening those in power.
Come back soon for another installment of the FARA Files.
